




































The cognitive neurosciences and evolutionary studies of the mind currently bear little methodological relation to each other.  The cognitive neurosciences use neural imaging techniques to determine which parts of the brain are active during various cognitive tasks, or study the cognitive defects that result from cerebral lesions and infarctions.  Evolutionary psychology borrows a method commonly used in cognitive science of postulating mental mechanisms to explain the performance of experimental subjects on cognitive tasks, and uses it instead to explain how our ancestors would have performed imagined cognitive tasks in a hypothetical Pleistocene environment.​[1]​  Even those philosophers who display a more sophisticated understanding of the notion of an evolutionary adaptation nevertheless have not given due consideration to the cognitive neurosciences.  Ruth Millikan (1993 ch. 2; 2002), for instance, in her endeavor to provide natural selection accounts of mental contents, argues that the adaptive value of our mental functions should be understood in the most general terms possible and need not be tied to the past.  But like the evolutionary psychologists, even she has been content with purely functional analyses of the mind and its contents and given scant attention to the underlying neurophysiology.
Consider Millikan's claim that substance concepts are adaptations that allow us to accumulate useful knowledge about individuals and real kinds in nature.  She says:

the task of substance concepts is to enable us to reidentify substances through diverse media and under diverse conditions, and to enable us over time to accumulate practical skills and theoretical knowledge about these substances and to use what we have learned.  (Millikan 2000, 2)  

Although Millikan may be a realist about the existence of natural kinds outside the mind, this metaphysical attitude does not carry over to the kinds of things she assumes about the mind, which have little basis in neurophysiology.  Her substance concepts are arranged in hierarchies that in fact resemble the data structures of artificial intelligence more than anything we know from neuroscience.  She also appears to assume that there is a unitary mind in which our substance concepts can connect with our perceptual and motor skills.  Empirical work in the cognitive neurosciences questions this assumption.  Thus, a more careful consideration of the neurosciences could lead her to revise what she says about the functional role and meaning of substance concepts.  Although they may play an important role in the accumulation and social exchange of knowledge as well as in planning and choosing a course of action, it is not clear that they play any role in the execution of action.  

Millikan on Substance Concepts

Millikan uses the term "substance" in the Aristotelian sense, in which it can include both primary substances or individuals like Mama and secondary substances or kinds of individuals like mouse and kinds of stuff like milk.  Natural kind concepts pick out real kinds in nature for Millikan.  Our terms for natural kinds function like proper names, identifying rather than classifying these kinds.  For Millikan, a substance concept is a knowing how to recognize something, rather than a knowing that.  To think of a substance is to "be able to represent it in a stable representational system," one that allows you to recognize that substance again under varying conditions (1998, 61).  She rejects the view that the extensions of our substance concepts are picked out by a description of the properties of that sort of substance.  It is not individual intentions or purposes but rather unconscious biological functions that connect substance concepts to their extensions.  The extension of a substance concept is whatever substance in the world natural selection designed that concept to track (2000, 49-50).  Substance concepts do not depend on language for her.  She holds that we share the ability to recognize individuals and natural kinds with the higher animals, at least to the extent that animals are able to reidentify Mama, mouse, and milk (2000, 108).  That we have this ability she regards as an empirically testable hypothesis.  She says:  "experiments need to be designed and interpreted with it in mind that the cognitive systems are designed by evolution and tuned by experience to find real-world substances, not random logically possible ones" (2000, 83; 1998, 63).
According to Millikan, natural selection has not given her the ability to identify any particular substance, not even her husband, but rather the capacity to acquire this ability (2000, 51).  This ability is acquired through interacting with her environment.  Natural selection "selected for mechanisms that become tuned through interaction with the environment to do things of useful kinds" (2000, 63).  For an organism to know how to do something as a result of learning is for it to have some mechanism that was designed by natural selection that is capable of being tuned to doing things of this sort, which was tuned in similar ways by the organism's ancestors when they were learning to do similar sorts of things.  These learning mechanisms may include "trial-and-error learning, learning by association, by imitation, by figuring something out, and so forth" (ibid.).  
For Millikan, to have the concept of a substance is to have the ability to know which of its properties can be generalized to new encounters and what sorts of questions can be asked about it.  We can ask how tall Mama is, but not how tall milk is, and we can expect Mama to be the same size the next time we see her.  But to know what sort of questions we can ask of something, we need to know what sort of substance it is:  is it a person, an animal species, a chemical element or compound, a physical object, or something else?  For Millikan, these groupings correspond not to substances but to substance templates (2000, 9-10).  Substance templates tell us which properties of objects we can expect to remain stable through changes in circumstances, such as color with lighting (2000, 106-108).  Substance templates like animal and mammal species are also substance concepts in their own right.  These substance templates can form hierarchies, such as animal, mammal, and human being.  However, for Millikan, there is no highest category of "substance" or "being" that would include both human beings and butter.  Although the concept of a human being may belong to a nested hierarchy of kinds of animals, any one particular human individual can belong to more than one category, such as professor, parent, and neighbor, that do not all belong to the same hierarchy (2000, 29-31).
Generally, Millikan thinks, these substance templates are "discovered" through "something like meta-inductions," although she cites some work in cognitive and developmental psychology that suggests that "Some grasp of certain templates, some grasp of the structure of certain substance domains, may be wired in" (2000, 30).​[2]​  She holds that there is evidence that some of these templates, "such as physical kinds, animal kinds, plant kinds, artifact kinds, social kinds and so forth," may be "endogenous" (2000, 82).  Whether such templates are built in is of course an empirical question.  However, the psychological literature she cites provides only indirect evidence for the claim that these substance templates are hard-wired or endogenous by showing how this hypothesis can explain the performance of subjects on cognitive tasks.  The cognitive and developmental psychological literature she cites could itself benefit from closer ties to the neurosciences.
Millikan's substance templates bear a prima facie resemblance to data structures such as Minsky's (1975) frames and Schank's scripts (1975), which were widely used in artificial intelligence in the 1970s to model such cognitive tasks as understanding natural language.​[3]​  Just as a template tells us what sorts of questions can or cannot be asked about something, a frame will specify certain elements as fixed, leaving open certain "terminals" where other characteristics are to be filled in differently for different kinds of things.  Also, frames and templates are arranged hierarchically.  Minsky's frames include events as well as kinds of things.  Similarly, Millikan (1998, 92) is willing to include kinds of events such as hearing Beethoven's Fifth Symphony or siesta time as having definite properties that remain invariant across repeated encounters in the same way that substances do.  Among the many problems with frames and scripts there is at least one that Millikan's templates appear to share.  Consider the way Schank's scripts were meant to allow AI systems to provide intelligent answers to questions about stories:  in order to understand the stories, they need to apply scripts.  But how do they know which scripts to apply unless they already understand the story?  Similarly, how does a child know whether to apply a template for an individual, a woman, or a member of the human species when it sees Mama?  Millikan assures us that these are all separate concepts (1998, 97), but what or who is keeping them separate?  
One important difference between Millikan's templates and the data structures of AI is that the substance concepts to which they are linked are not just descriptions or lists of properties but are supposed to include a variety of perceptual and even motor skills.  In particular, she holds that these concepts involve the skill of keeping track of something, at first perceptually and then conceptually.  Citing the work of Gopnik and Meltzoff (1996), Millikan says that the perceptual mechanisms by which infants track things involve the motion, location, and trajectory, but not the properties of the tracked object (2000, 77).  It is perhaps for this reason that, at least according to Xu and Carey (1996), 10-month old infants are not surprised when one kind of object turns into another, but are surprised if one object turns into two.  This changes by 12 months.  That one thing does not turn into another thing appears to be something that infants have to learn.  Perceptual tracking abilities make it possible for the infant to observe the object long enough to observe which sorts of properties remain the same and which do not (Millikan 2000, 77).
Perceptual tracking then makes possible what Millikan calls "conceptual tracking," which is what comes into play when we keep track of something through its properties over discontinuities of space and time.  Conceptual tracking also depends on additional perceptual mechanisms, such as those involved in perceiving color constancy, recognizing the same sizes and shapes at various angles and distances, and recognizing faces (2000, 78-79):

The general method used for reidentification of every substance is the same.  One relies on certain expected, that is, projected, continuities over times or occasions of encounter, for example, continuity in spatial projectory, in color, in shape, in odor, in general arrangement of parts, in manner of motion.  Or one may rely on continuity in identity of parts or other associated features.  Perhaps it is the shape of your face, or just your eyes that I recognize immediately as indicative of you, or your voice, or your signature, or your walk, or your humor, or your name . . .  (Millikan 2000, 155-156)

According to Millikan, motor skills are also involved in our tracking abilities:  "My ability to track with my feet as well as my eyes and head may be involved here, hence my ability to walk over rough ground or to avoid slipping on ice" (2000, 156).  For Millikan, these ways of reidentifying cannot be divided nonarbitrarily into discrete ways of identifying.  Rather, identifying or keeping track of something involves a complex, integrated set of skills that reinforce each other (ibid.).




Discussion of Relevant Work in Neuroscience

When Millikan (1998) presented an early version of her views on substance concepts in a Behavioral and Brain Sciences open peer commentary forum, philosophers and psychologists questioned whether there is in fact some sort of conceptual mechanism that tracks individuals, substances, and stuffs all in the same way.  Pascal Boyer (1998), for instance, argued that domain-specific tracking mechanisms such as face recognizers are more evolutionarily plausible than a domain-general tracking mechanisms for substance of all kinds.  Colin Allen (1998) and Paul Bloom (1998) questioned whether animals and prelinguistic infants track kinds at all or just properties and individuals.  None of the BBS commentators, however, appear to have been neuroscientists, and none of them asked whether there actually is a part of the brain that is organized in accordance with substance concepts and templates and if there is, whether this part of the brain is connected with practical skills and the coordination of bodily motion. 
Alfonso Caramazza provides neuropathological evidence that would seem to support Millikan.  He reports that the abilities to identify categories of animals, fruits and vegetables, artifacts, and body parts can be damaged separately (2000, 1037).  As he points out, these are precisely the sorts of objects for which the ability to pick out would have adaptive significance:

evolutionary pressures resulted in specialized neural mechanisms for perceptually and conceptually distinguishing specific kinds of objects, leading to the categorical organization of knowledge in the brain.  (Caramazza 2000, 1043).

Curiously, he also reports on one patient who was unable to name and categorize fruits and vegetables from pictures, touch, or definitions, but who, when he heard the names, could point to the correct pictures and name their properties, and when he read their names, could categorize them correctly (Hart, Berndt, and Caramazza 1985).  However, he does not consider cases like this to provide evidence that our concepts are organized by sensory modality rather than in a unified system (Caramazza 2000, 1038).
Alex Martin and his associates disagree with Caramazza, arguing that the cerebral cortex is organized in accordance with properties such as shape, color, and motion, rather than in accordance with kinds of objects such as animals or tools.  Using neural imaging techniques such as positron emission tomography and functional magnetic resonance imaging that allow the researcher to see what part of the brain is active during various cognitive tasks, they have found that information about these properties is stored in different parts of the brain, near the sensory and motor parts of the brain that were active when the information was acquired (Martin et al. 2000, 1023).  In one experiment a subject is shown a line drawing of a wagon and asked what it is (wagon), what color it usually is (red), and what action is usually associated with it (pulling).  A different part of the brain is activated for each answer (2000, 1024-1025).  However, they also suggest that the part of the cortex for perceiving motion may have sub-regions for animals and tools (2000, 1031-1032).
In reply, Caramazza (2000, 1037) argues that the evidence does not support modality-specific systems of conceptual organization such as Martin posits.  He says that modality-specific systems cannot account for category-specific deficits, unless, of course, we assume that the visual system is more important for recognizing animals than for artifacts, or that the system for understanding functions is more important for recognizing artifacts than for animals (2000, 1039).  But this assumption seems entirely reasonable.  Surely animals of the same kind bear a greater visual similarity to each other than do tools of the same kind.  Caramazza also argues that what Martin's neural imaging studies show is that different parts of the brain may be involved in processing different sorts of perceptions.  The conceptual content of our thoughts may not be distributed in the same way as perceptual content (2000, 1042).  However, Caramazza does not make it clear why he says that Martin's experiments, which involve subjects drawing answers from memory, involve perceptual rather than conceptual content.  Finally, Caramazza also cites evidence of patients who have trouble identifying just animals and not fruits and vegetables, which would indeed be difficult for the hypothesis of a modality-specific organization to explain (2000, 1038-1039).
Perhaps what we will find in the cortex are neither simple hierarchies of substance types such as Millikan proposes nor an organization of concepts in accordance with perceptual properties, but more complex systems of organization involving both substance and property concepts.  For instance, instead of walk- and face-recognizers feeding into a hierarchy of substance concepts, each of these systems may be divided up by the faces or walks that we recognize.  This would explain the common experience of recognizing a face but not being able to recall the name or anything about where you have seen this person before.  
It may seem irrational or suboptimal for representations of different properties of the same individual to be distributed all over the cortex rather than all held in one place.  But one could argue that it would in fact make more sense for the brain to be organized by perceptual properties rather than by substance concepts.  Jon Kaas argues that the brain's having multiple visual areas simplifies the problem of interconnecting functionally related groups of neurons:

More specifically, the local connections that would be needed to sharpen the tuning of individual neurons for one of the many attributes of a complex stimulus would be long if neurons for all the different attributes were in the same visual area.  Having many retinotopic maps allows most of the computing to be done with short local connections, although the receiving and sending information would requires long connections between areas and subcortical structures.  (Kaas 1989, 467)

He also argues that it would be easier for the genetic programming to guide brain development if the brain were organized with different areas for different visual attributes (ibid.).  So by analogy, we could argue that it would also make biological sense to have separate areas for each of the sensory modalities.  To organize the brain by substance concepts would require putting neurons with unrelated functions in the same area.  There would have to be either long connections to functionally related neurons elsewhere in the brain, or massive functional redundancy, with assemblies of neurons performing similar functions at each area dedicated to a particular substance.
The presence of more than one visual area in the human brain also raises a problem for Millikan's assumption that our substance concepts are tied to practical skills.  Melvyn Goodale and his associates present pathological cases that suggest that the visual pathway involved in our ability to identify objects is not the same as that involved in reaching out and grasping them.  Patients with damage to the posterior parietal cortex display optic ataxia.  That is, they are unable to reach out and grasp objects in the field contralateral to the brain lesion, but have no trouble recognizing and describing these objects and some can even describe where they are.  One patient had trouble adjusting her hands and fingers properly to grasp objects, although once they made contact with these objects, she could use her sense of touch to make these adjustments.  On the other hand, patients with damage to the occipito-temporal region display visual form agnosia.  They cannot recognize or describe common objects, faces, or drawings, but have no trouble using vision to move about in the world in a way that avoids obstacles.  Goodale and his associates describe one patient who had trouble describing or even manually indicating the orientation of a slot in which she was to slip a card, but had no trouble actually putting the card in the slot (Goodale 2000, 368-370; Goodale et al. 1996, 108ff.).​[4]​  
Goodale finds this distinction between two visual pathways based on neuropathological evidence reflected in the organization of the visual pathways in the brain of the macaque monkey.  One pathway, which he calls the ventral stream, proceeds from the retina through the lateral geniculate nuclei and the primary visual cortex and projects to the inferior temporal cortex.  Another pathway, the dorsal stream, proceeds in part through the same pathway but also receives input from the superior colliculus and other subcortical structures and projects to the posterior parietal cortex (Goodale 2000, 365-367).  These two systems work together to produce adaptive behavior.  The ventral system provides perception-based knowledge of objects and their relations and guides the selection of the goal and the appropriate action, while the dorsal system is involved in the execution and control of skilled action.  The task of the ventral visual system, as Goodale describes it, is closely related to what Millikan describes as the function of substance concepts. It is:

to identify objects and their relations, classify those objects and relations, and attach meaning and significance to them.  Such operations are essential for engaging in social interactions, exchanging information with others, accumulating a knowledge base about the world, and choosing among different courses of action.  (Goodale et. al 1996, 114)

Both systems use similar information about the shape, size, location, and orientation of the object, but process and use it differently.  For the ventral system, it is the identity of the objects, not their relationship to the observer, that is of primary concerns, while the dorsal system needs instantaneous information about the position and disposition of the object relative to the observer (Goodale et al. 1996, 115).  To put it in other words, it is the visuomotor system that is involved in tracking spatiotemporal trajectories.  Vernon Mountcastle's (1995) studies of macaques locate the neurons that are involved in tracking spatiotemporal trajectories by eye and hand in the parietal cortex, that is, in the visuomotor system for guiding movements.  Giacomo Rizzolatti (2000) and his associates have found that the visuomotor system in macaques also plays a role in the ability to recognize actions such as grasping and tearing in others and imitate them.
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^1	 	To be fair, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (2000, 1268) cite recent studies with V. Stone of the performance of a brain-damaged patient in support of their theories about a mental module dedicated to reasoning about social exchange.  But this is only a single case and it is not corroborated with neural imaging studies.
^2	 	Millikan (2000, 30; 2000, 82) cites Atran 1989; Boyer 1998; Carey 1985; Gallistel et al. 1993; Gelman and Coley 1991; Keil 1979, 1989; Markman 1989; Marler 1993; and Spelke 1989, 1993. 
^3	  	For a detailed discussion of the problems with this research program in artificial intelligence, see Hubert Dreyfus's "Introduction to the Revised Edition (1979)" of What Computers Still Can't Do (1992), especially the section that begins on page 27.
^4	 	Goodale (2000, 373-374) also reports that the visuomotor system is not subject to the same illusions as the perceptual system involved in identifying objects.
